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Hungary’s political development under the Orbán government is by now a familiar
topic. In April Barroso confirmed the European Commission’s concern that
Hungary’s new constitution infringe EU legislation and the rule of law. Indeed,
some commentators speak of ‘the corrosion of constitutional democracy’ or even
a possible dictatorship in the EU. Romania is another problematic case. Its slide
towards authoritarianism has not been (yet) enshrined in a new constitution. But
its 2012 political crisis has seen by some as a coup d’état, during which Ponta’s
government aimed at removing all checks and balances on its power to impeach
President B#sescu.
These developments raise fundamental questions. What is the future of democracy
in the EU? Can authoritarianism be kept at bay, especially during crises? Who is
the true sovereign and by what right? Who is the guardian of the constitution? What
is the role of a constitutional court (CC)? These questions recall the Weimar crisis
in the 1930s. Ellen Kennedy writes: ‘in the new democracies of Eastern Europe …
the major fault lines of Weimar liberalism have reappeared: emergency powers, the
courts as “defenders of the constitution”, mobilization of antiliberal politics, ethnic
identity politics, illiberal culture, and contested legitimacy’.
David Dyzenhaus’s Legality and Legitimacy: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen and
Hermann Heller in Weimar (1999) analysed the Weimar crisis with an eye to offering
solutions to today’s crisis of liberalism. Actually, we can speak of two crises: the
crisis of Western pluralism, tolerating social groups whose anti-pluralistic world-
views reject the dominant order, and the crisis of legitimacy new democracies
face. His book touches more explicitly on the former crisis. But he encourages the
application of his analysis to other regions. So, after conversations with Iulia Motoc,
judge on the CC of Romania, we decided to organize the workshop “Legality and
Legitimacy: From Weimar 1932 to Bucharest 2012?”, looking at parallels between
Weimar and Hungary/Romania. The interdisciplinary event, hosted by the Brussels
campus of the University of Kent, was attended by legal and political theorists,
philosophers, historians and EU officials, following Dyzenhaus’s model of ‘Integrative
Jurisprudence’ combining politics, morality and history. I will reflect on overall
findings.
Eleanor Curran (Kent Law School) introduced the main philosophical issues by
focusing on Hobbes’s account of legality and legitimacy, discussed by Dyzenhaus
in his chapter on Carl Schmitt. She argued that Schmitt and Dyzenhaus are too
quick to view Hobbes’s account of law as an uncompromising absolutism involving a
positivist command theory. Hobbes isn’t arguing that the sovereign has unrestricted
powers and his subjects must obey unconditionally. His theory also contains
elements of natural law reasoning: ‘The Law of Nature, and the Civill law, contain
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each other, and are of equal extent’ (Leviathan, ch. 26). This entails the sovereign’s
duty to make moral laws, discerned by reason.
The same goes for Hobbes’s theory of rights: some rights are inalienable, e.g.
the right of resistance to the sovereign or the right to seek protection elsewhere.
The final arbiter of legitimacy is the individual, conscientious citizen. He is the
guardian of the constitution. So Hobbes’s theory is less a precursor of Schmitt’s
decisionism or Kelsen’s positivism, and more akin to the social republicanism of
Heller (Dyzenhaus’s hero), whose ideal is near total political participation. I think
it’s obvious that most democracies fall short of this ideal, but especially those with
recent totalitarian histories, like Romania and Hungary. My colleague at Nottingham,
Cosmin S. Cercel, advocated more attention to these histories, and especially to
conceptions of legality in anti-democratic ideologies. It is too often forgotten that
Eastern Europe has a recent totalitarian experience – Communism.
The discussion then turned to Dyzenhaus’s main topic, the Weimar crisis and
Schmitt’s and Kelsen’s responses to it. In July 1932 Chancellor von Papen organised
a coup d’état against Prussia (Preußenschlag) on the basis of emergency powers
granted to the Reich’s President by Art. 48 of Weimar’s constitution. This abolished
the autonomy of Prussia, a stronghold of republicanism, and prepared the path
for Hitler. As Harm Schepel (BSIS) suggested, the problem was not Weimar’s
constitution, which was among the most progressive of its time, but its adoption by a
country with a deficient understanding of liberalism. Similarly, East European political
systems today have good constitutions, but make bad use of them.
Prussia appealed to the Reichsgericht, claiming that the emergency decree
was unconstitutional. The Court dismissed the Reich’s claim that the Prussian
government was neglecting its duties, but endorsed the subjugation of Prussia,
since the Reich was on the verge of civil war. Following Dyzenhaus, I noted that
Carl Schmitt’s position on Prussia vs. Reich was faulty. Prussia had protested to
the Court that the President had violated his impartiality, intervening on behalf of
an alliance between von Papen and the Nazis. Schmitt argued that von Papen had
full legitimacy, since his mandate was given by the President, the guardian of the
constitution. I argued that this was a sophism: neither von Papen nor Hindenburg
had been independent of party politics. Schmitt’s worry that a government with a
parliamentary mandate is part of the problem, since it stands under the control of
party politics, was hypocritical. Schmitt would deny that the Nazis were an ordinary
party, since they had the support of the Volk, the true sovereign. Not true: the
Communist party had strong support too.
Schmitt generally believed that liberalism is unable to draw the friend-enemy
distinction without contradiction, because it grants equal rights to power to its
opponent. Hence, pluralism is less preferable than a homogeneous society, in which
the internal enemy has been eradicated. As workshop participants pointed out, this
rejection of negotiation and compromise is reminiscent of the sharp polarisation
of the political landscape in Hungary and Romania. Orbán’s tendency to blame all
criticism on inner and outer enemies is one example. Also, Schmitt’s argument does
not work against value-based conceptions of liberalism. Today’s German constitution
exemplifies a ‘fortified democracy’, whose immutable core of values (fdGO) can’t be
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changed even by majority vote. Anybody acting or intending to act against it will be
a prosecutable enemy of the constitution. It seems to me that like Schmitt the new
authoritarians of Eastern Europe confuse legitimate political opponents with enemies
of the nation or people.
Schmitt also denied that the Reichsgericht had jurisdiction over the constitutional
problems involved in Prussia vs. Reich. The Court, in his view, guarded the
constitution only in legal matters, but the deposition of the Prussian government had
been a political issue, and here the guardian of the constitution was the President.
Schmitt favoured the primacy of the political over law; genuine political power
shouldn’t be constrained by legal statutes. ‘Sovereign is he who decides on the
state of the exception’ (Political Theology, 1922). This is ambiguous, as Dyzenhaus
shows. It can mean ‘Whoever factually decides, by sheer force, is the sovereign’,
but also ‘Whoever is invested with the power to decide, is the sovereign’. The latter
reading allows for political power to be constrained by a CC, as envisaged by Kelsen
in “Wesen und Entwicklung der Staatsgerichtsbarkeit” (1929). Schmitt’s rejection of
constitutional review is unfounded.
Workshop participants pointed out that the political classes of both Romania and
Hungary are inclined to a more ‘Schmittian’ than ‘Kelsean’ view of the relation
between politics and law, as visible from the attacks both CCs suffered in recent
years. Orbán’s curtailing of the powers of the Hungarian Court are well known. The
powers of the Romanian Court were curtailed by the Ponta government during the
2012 crisis, and individual judges, such as Aspazia Cojocaru and Iulia Motoc, were
threatened with dismissal, attacked in USL-friendly media and even had their lives
threatened. As Motoc later explained, such attacks against constitutional judges are
without precedent in Europe. They did not occur even in Weimar.
Cristina Arion (European Parliament) explained that the Romanian CC tried
to assume its function as the guardian of the constitution as best as it could,
defending its own powers to rule on the constitutionality of decisions adopted by
the Parliament. Being placed under tremendous pressure, however, the Court was
polarized and its decisions ultimately lacked coherence. For instance, the Court
upheld the removal from office of the speakers of both houses of the Parliament,
despite procedural irregularities, and refused to take a stance on the constitutional
conflict between Parliament and President. Arion also pointed out that it should give
cause for concern that Ponta’s government attempted to reach its goals mainly by
emergency decree, especially in the light of the Weimar crisis.
Several points emerged repeatedly during the discussion. One concerned the role
the EU ought to take towards the erosion of constitutionalism in Eastern Europe. The
consensus was that the EU does not only have the right, but the duty to intervene
against nefarious political developments. In the 20th century, Europe witnessed
two world wars, the worst genocide in history and was wrecked by two totalitarian
ideologies. The EU was created with these events in mind, and it is therefore the
guardian of European democracy and stability. It needs to understand itself as a
‘fortified democracy’. Whether new institutions need to be invented, is an open
question. Since Hungary and Romania are recipients of EU funds, the EU can
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exercise financial pressure. Such countries also care about their external image, so
‘soft power’ is another a tool. At the time of its accession Romania (and Bulgaria)
was subjected to the CVM, a further mechanism instrumental in safeguarding the
rule of law. I think it is fair to conclude, with Israel Butler, that governments ‘with
serious rule of law problems are unlikely to respond to quiet diplomacy or even
naming and shaming, unless this is supported by the threat of sanction.’
Another debated point was the crisis of legitimacy the EU itself faces. Here
opinions were divided. Some participants, like Sebastian Payne (Kent Law School),
argued that the EU may be doomed to fail, because it was founded on the basis
of unrealistic economic expectations. Others were more optimistic. There are
remarkable similarities between Weimar’s failure and the current crisis. But there
are dissimilarities as well, which give rise to hope. Unlike the situation in the interwar
period, pace Carl Schmitt’s martial cravings and Orbán’s rejection of institutionalists
as ‘lazy’, we don’t have a culture of war and decisionism, but of peace, negotiation
and legalism in Europe today. This makes the spectre of a (military) dictatorship
unlikely, I believe. Ultimately, the difference between Weimar and today’s Europe is
Weimar’s own failure. We know today all too well what might happen if constitutional
democracy fails. The Damoclean sword of history urges us to save the European
project.
(Thanks to Cristina Arion, Cosmin S. Cercel, Eleanor Curran, Anna Dimitrijevics,
James Fowler and Michael Inwood for advice in writing this report.)
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